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What Do Labor Productivity Data Show about
Economies of Scale: Comment*

I. Introduction

In a recent article, Edward Miller attempted to draw inferences about the extent of economies of scale from comparisons of the labor productivity of firms of different sizes in the
same industry [5]. More specifically, he used various measures of labor productivity, includ-

ing value of shipments per employee, valued added per employee, "profits" per employee,
and value of raw materials processed per employee, and, for a sample of 448 four-digit U.S.
manufacturing industries, he compared the average labor productivity of the largest four
firms to the average labor productivity of the rest of the firms in the same industry, using
1972 Census data [14]. He reported that, regardless of the measure of labor productivity employed, the largest four firms had the higher labor productivity in the vast majority of cases,

and that, "on average", the largest four firms enjoyed a labor productivity advantage over
the "rest of the industry" that ranged from 37 percent (value added) to 57 percent ("profits").
Miller's was not the first study to interpret such labor productivity data as evidence on

economies of scale.' However, his was the first to draw the momentous conclusion that

"compelling evidence of large economies of scale at the firm level for a major portion of
American industry" had now been uncovered [5, 486]. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that this claim is overblown and unwarranted, and that the evidence, in fact, is far
from compelling.

This paper is organized into two main sections. In the immediately following section it
is shown that, even if the observed labor productivity differences do reflect economies of
scale (hardly the only plausible interpretation), Miller's tests greatly exaggerate their importance. Then, in the next section, alternative explanations for the observed labor productivity

differences are briefly noted, and some indirect evidence is presented which is based on a
modified survivor technique. This evidence, while consistent with a number of plausible alternative hypotheses, is inconsistent with the scale economies interpretation. In the final sec-

tion, some less-than-momentous conclusions are offered.

II. The Exaggerated Extent of Economies of Scale
Even if the labor productivity differences reported by Miller reflect economies of scale, there

are good reasons for believing that the importance of economies of scale has been exagger* This research was supported by a Summer Faculty Fellowship awarded by the College of Business Administration at Marquette University.
1. See, for example, Caves, Khalilzadeh-Shirazi, and Porter [4], who apply a similar technique to plant size
distributions. For a critique of their methods, see Brush [3].
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ated in the Miller study. For example, he reports that in 374 of 448 industries (83 perc

the largest four firms had greater value added per employee than did the "rest of the indu

try". (The "rest of the industry" had the greater value added per employee in 48, or 11 per

cent, of the cases.) No serious student of economies of scale would find this result surprisin

implying as it does merely that there are some economies of scale in most industries and th
the largest four firms in most industries are, on the average, not so large as to encounter

ous diseconomies of scale.2 But Miller's approach leaves the impression (he does not sta

explicitly) that the largest four firms nearly always have higher labor productivity than al

the other firms in the industry, and that firms have to be at least as large as the "Big Fou

order to be optimally efficient. Of course, the fact that the "Big Four" have higher labor p

ductivity than the average for the "rest of the industry" does not necessarily imply that t

have higher labor productivity than the firms ranked 5th through 8th in size, or for that m

ter, firms even smaller. The really important empirical problems with respect to economies

of scale, laden with policy implications, are to estimate minimum optimal firm size, its rel

tionship to the size of the market, and the resultant minimum level of market concentrati

consistent with efficiency. Despite the title of his article, Miller provides little evidenc

these questions and on the "extent of economies of scale" within individual industries.

The foregoing suggests that it might be worthwhile to compare the labor productivity

the largest four firms with that of the "next four largest firms", rather than with the "rest

the industry". Since it seems not to matter greatly which measure of labor productivit

employed, the ratio of value added per employee (four largest firms) to value added per em

ployee (next four largest firms) has been calculated for each of 444 Census manufactur

industries for which the requisite data were available for 1972. The size distribution of thes

ratios appears in Table I.3

Those who choose to interpret labor productivity data as evidence of economies of scale

will still find support in Table I for the proposition that economies of scale frequently exte

out to the size of the largest four firms. The largest four firms have the higher labor prod

tivity in 282 out of 444 cases (64 percent). Still, the superiority of the largest four firms a

pears to be much less pervasive than Miller's comparison suggested. And if these 282

imply economies of scale, then presumably there are 150 industries (34 percent of the total

in which diseconomies of scale exist. In 57 of these industries (13 percent of the total samp

the "next four largest firms" have a labor productivity advantage of more than 25 per
over the largest four firms.

While the incidence of cases in which the largest four firms have the advantage

greatly reduced by this approach as compared to Miller's, so too is the average magnitude of

the advantage. The median ratio for the entire 444 industry sample is only 1.10, and the ge

metric mean is 1.12. These figures imply an "average" advantage for the largest four f

far less than the 37 percent reported by Miller,4 and are of an order of magnitude which o

2. As for the "average" 37 percent large-firm advantage, this may be highly misleading, as noted below.
3. The seemingly odd size class limits serve the interest of symmetry. While a ratio of 1.50 implies a 50 per
greater labor productivity by the four largest firms, a ratio of 0.67 implies approximately a 50 percent greater
productivity by the next four largest firms compared to the four largest.
4. While it is not entirely clear, it appears that the average 37 percent advantage in value added per emplo
(and other similar figures reported by Miller) was obtained by calculating a simple average of the ratios of va
added per employee (largest four firms) to value added per employee (rest of industry). If so, a faulty procedur
been used. Suppose, for example, that in half of the industries in the sample the largest four firms have twic

labor productivity of the rest of the industry (ratio of 2.0), while in the other half, the rest of the industry has tw

the labor productivity of the largest four firms (ratio of 0.50). The simple arithmetic mean of the ratios wou
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Table I. Distribution of the Ratio of Value Added per Employee (four largest firms) to Value Added per Employee
(next four largest firms), 1972

Range of Ratio No. of Industries
0.00

-

0.49

4

0.50

-

0.66

16

0.67

-

0.79

37

0.80

-

0.99

93

1.00

-

1.00

12

1.01

-

1.25

136

1.26

-

1.50

84

1.51

-

2.00

47

Over

2.00

15

Total 444

Source: Calculated from data in U.S. Bureau of the Census [14].

ers have suggested might easily be explained away by fac

While there may in fact be many individual industrie

scale extend out to the size of the largest firms (in Table

the calculated "relative labor productivity ratio" excee
appear also to be many industries (albeit fewer) in whi
the overall picture is not nearly as one-sided as that p

One further point is worthy of mention before clo

productivity differences reflect economies of scale, and e

substantially higher labor productivity than the next four

that a firm needs to be anywhere near as large as the lar

mally efficient. This is because there often is a consid
"Big Four" and the "Next Four" firms. For example, i

2043), the largest four firms had a 47 percent higher val

Four" in 1972. But in terms of value of shipments, th

1.25, but surely it would be inappr6priate to conclude that, "on averag
value added per employee. With this kind of data, the geometric mea

its value would be 1.00.

5. See Caves, Khalilizadeh-Shirazi, and Porter [4]. It should be noted that this study, while employing

same kind of measure as did Miller's, was concerned with estimating the importance of scale economies at the p
level, and did not use precisely the same measure as discussed in this paper.
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was eleven times as large as the average member of the "Next Four". Conceivably, being
merely five times as large might have sufficed to take advantage of all economies of scale.6

III. The Soundness of the Scale Economies Interpretation
Given the various alternative explanations for differences in labor productivity, it is a mys-

tery why anyone would seize upon scale economies as the explanation. Firms of different
sizes in the same Census industry may differ with respect to labor productivity (as measured

by value added per employee) for many reasons. They may differ in capital intensity, the
quality of their labor inputs, the extent of monopsony power, the extent to which they utilize

purchased services, such as advertising and telephone, the geographical market they serve,
the extent to which they enjoy product differentiation advantages, and the product or prod-

uct mixes which they are engaged in producing. Miller attempted to deal with several of
these factors, although not in an entirely convincing manner, but other possible explanations

were all but ignored.
One factor which would seem to merit more consideration that it has received are differ-

ences in product or product mix. While Miller writes of the "fine level of detail" characterizing the four-digit Census industries [5, 470], there appears to be a consensus that, more often than not, the four digit Census industry definitions are excessively broad and encompass

non-competing and essentially different products [2, 132; 8, 57; 11, 199]. To take just one
among numerous ready examples, one must wonder how meaningful it is to assert that the
four largest producers in SIC 3711 (Motor Vehicles and Passenger Car Bodies) had 57 percent greater value added per employee than did the next four largest firms in 1972. Presumably the four largest firms produced a lot of passenger automobiles, but the next four largest

firms must have been principally engaged in producing large highway trucks, or buses, or
armored cars, or fire engines, or universal military carriers, or one of the several other prod-

ucts classified in SIC 3711.7
Unfortunately, the kinds of consistent and comparable data necessary to sort out all the

various possible causes of labor productivity differentials among different firm sizes for a
large sample of individual industries are not available. In this section, a variant of the survi-

vor technique is used to provide some indirect evidence on the validity of Miller's scaleeconomies hypothesis.8 If the largest firms have a truly substantial efficiency advantage over
other firms, it is reasonable to expect that they will increase their market shares over time.
This is true regardless of whether the efficiency advantage reflects real and socially beneficial, or merely pecuniary and private, advantages of size. Applying the technique in reverse,
if top-level concentration does not increase in industries in which the largest four firms have

substantially higher labor productivity than the next four firms, this would certainly cast
doubt on the validity of the scale-economies hypothesis.

One problem with applying this test is that the data on value added per employee are
quite volatile from one Census year to another. The four largest firms may appear to have a
6. It must be recognized, on the other hand, that in some cases there may be only one or even no firms of minimum optimal scale in the industry. Unfortunately, the data exist only for groups of four or more firms.
7. Imported automobiles are, of course, not counted in the Census figures, and there were only four significant
domestic producers of automobiles in 1972.
8. Examples of the use of the survivor technique to estimate economies of scale include the studies of Stigler

[12], Saving [7], Weiss [15], and Shepherd [10].
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Table II. Examples of Shifts in the Ratio of Value Added per Employee (four largest firms) to Value Added per
Employee (next four largest firms), 1967 to 1972

SIC No. 1967 Ratio 1972 Ratio
2282

0.65

1.44

2323

2.06

0.65

2541

2.33

0.45

3281

0.67

1.62

3442

2.14

0.73

3672

2.74

1.02

3715

0.77

1.55

substantial labor productiv
in the immediately precedi
which comparable data are

switched
cases)

For

between

between

the

the

entire

employee

(four

the
two

"Big

Censu

sample,
largest

the

firm

+0.33.

To get around the problem of data volatility, all industries were identified for which th

"relative labor productivity ratio" exceeded 1.25 in both 1967 and 1972, and the change

the value of shipments four-firm concentration ratios between 1967 and 1972 were compute

for these industries. Since very small changes in concentration ratios typically mean little b
cause of the effects of random elements and/or rounding errors, it is appropriate to focus

non-trivial changes, and this philosophy is reflected in Table III, which shows the frequency

distribution of concentration changes for the 67 industries for which the relative labor pro

ductivity ratio exceeded 1.25 in both 1967 and 1972.
In Table III it can be observed that only 24 of the 67 industries (36 percent) exhibi
positive concentration changes as large as three percentage points, with 12 (18 perce

showing increases of six percentage points or more. For the entire sample of 343 industries,

107 (31 percent) had increases of three percentage points or more, with 49 (14 percent) show

ing increases of six percentage points or more. In spite of what some would interpret

substantial efficiency advantage for the largest four firms,'0 the 67 industry sub-sample di
9. The raw data for 1967 can be found in U.S. Bureau of the Census [13].
10. For the 67 industry sub-sample, the relative labor productivity ratios ranged from 1.25 to 4.03, with a
dian of 1.58, in 1972.
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Table III. Frequency Distribution of Four-Firm Concentration Ratio Changes, All Industries for Which the Ratio
of Value Added per Employee (four largest firms) to Value Added per Employee (next four largest firms) Exceeded
1.25 in Both 1967 and 1972

Concentration Change

(Percentage Points) No. of Industries
-12

and

-9

to

Down

-11

1

3

-6

to

-8

2

-3

to

-5

5

-2

to

+2

32

+3

to

+5

12

+6

+9

+12

to

to

+8

+11

and

Up

6

3

3

Total 67

Source: Computed from U.S. Bureau of the Census [13; 14].

not behave much differently with respect to co
whole. While other factors may also be at work

mean 1967 four-firm concentration ratio for the 6

mean ratio for the sample as a whole (46.8 to 38.4),

further increases in concentration, and an examina

factor has little effect on the validity of the comp

Perhaps a 25 percent labor productivity advantag

cant economies of scale, given the other possible ex

should be noted that the number of cases of "sig
rapidly as one raises the criterion ratio. In Table

of the 1967-72 concentration changes for the 27 in

ductivity ratio exceeded 1.50 in both 1967 and 19
four firms in each of these industries should have

the next four largest firms." Concentration increas

cuffrred in only seven (26 percent) of these industr

more occurred in only four (15 percent). The re
11. For these 27 industries, the relative labor productivity
1.88, in 1972.
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Table IV. Frequency Distribution of Four-Firm Concentration Ratio Changes, All Industries for Which the Ratio
of Value Added per Employee (four largest firms) to Value Added per Employee (next four largest firms) Exceeded
1.50 in Both 1967 and 1972

Concentration Change

(Percentage Points) No. of Industries
-12

and

-9

Down

to

-11

2

0

-6

to

-8

1

-3

to

-5

2

-2

to

+2

15

+3

to

+5

3

+6

to

+8

2

+9

+12

to

+11

and

Up

0

2

Total 27

Source: Computed from U.S. Bureau of the Census [13; 14].

those for the sample as a whole, and are inconsis

although they are perfectly consistent with some of

ing the possibility that firms of different sizes are
mixes.

IV. Concluding Remarks
The extent of economies of scale is an empirical question with tremendous implications for
the making of public policy. Unfortunately, no method of estimation has yet been developed

that is both reasonably reliable and easy in its application over a wide range of industry. As
the arguments and results of this paper make clear, Miller's "scale-economies" interpretation

of labor productivity data is open to serious question. When it comes to estimating economies of scale at the firm level, there at present appears to be no acceptable substitute for the

laborious procedures of Bain [1], Pratten [6], and Scherer et al. [9], who have produced such
estimates for a relatively small number of manufacturing industries in the U.S., Great Brit-

ain, and elsewhere. Given the complexity of the scale economies estimation problem, no po-
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tential source of information should be ignored, but at the same time, simplistic interpretations must be avoided.
Brian C. Brush

Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
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